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Supreme Court Docket No. 46595-2018
Cassia County District Court CV-2017-290

v.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant/Respondent.

_____________________________
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_____________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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HONORABLE MICHAEL P. TRIBE
District Judge Presiding
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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Attorneys at Law
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2019 Plaintiff/Appellant Primera Beef filed its opening brief on appeal against
Defendant/Respondent, Allan Ward (“Respondent”), arguing that the district court erred in
granting Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Respondent filed his Brief on May 8, 2019
defending the court’s grant of summary judgment. Respondent’s Brief states that Respondent has
never received an executed copy of the Settlement Agreement which is the basis of this matter.
(pg. 1, FN 1). While this assertion is irrelevant to the present Appeal, Plaintiff/Appellant is
compelled to note that a copy of the fully executed Settlement Agreement was filed under seal
with the district court in this matter on November 17, 2017, prior to present counsel’s appearance
in the matter. Subsequent to the appearance of present counsel in this matter, on May 15, 2018
Primera Beef supplemented its discovery responses to provide a copy of the executed Settlement
Agreement to Respondent through his present counsel.
Primera Beef now submits this Reply Brief on appeal and respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Appellant has not waived the theory of implied agency.
Respondent claims in his Brief that Appellant has waived the opportunity to argue for

implied authority. However, the district court decision is based entirely upon a legal interpretation
of the law of implied authority. Therefore, Appellant’s opening brief focuses entirely upon the
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theory of authority implied from express authority. The very crux of the issue in this matter lies
in the legal interpretation of this Court’s explanation of implied agency. As stated in Caballero v.
Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d 1076 (2004), “Actual authority is that authority a principal
expressly grants to an agent or impliedly confers on an agent because it is usual, necessary, and
proper to achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent.” (Emphasis added).
Appellant’s opening brief focuses in on the expression of “necessary, usual, and proper”
which only needs to be analyzed in the face of an implied authority scenario. The other authorities
cited in Appellant’s opening brief also relate the application of implied authority. Respondent
expressly hired Mr. Roark to represent him in the criminal matter. It is beyond argument that
communicating with a prosecuting attorney is within the scope of representing a criminal
defendant.

B.

The District Court Erred in finding that Respondent’s attorney was not acting within the
scope of his authority at the time he disclosed the terms of the confidential Settlement
Agreement.
There is no dispute that under Idaho Law “The relationship between an attorney and client

is one of agency.” Muncey v. Children’s Home Finding and Aid Soc. Of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147,
151, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962). There has been no argument made that communications between
a criminal defense attorney and a prosecuting attorney do not lie within the implied scope of
representing a defendant in a criminal matter. Respondent’s argument is simply that during the
course of the communications between his criminal defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney
the agency was lost by virtue of Respondent’s attorney making improper disclosures. Respondent

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

-2-

reaches this conclusion by focusing on the word “proper” as used by this Court in explaining what
constitutes implied authority.
Clearly, Respondent has conflated the use of “proper” as used by this Court to assess
whether an action is properly within the scope of one’s authority, and instead uses it to conclude
that if an action is “improper” in anyway it thereby negates authority that had been granted to an
agent. Such a conclusion negates the entire purpose of the law of agency.
Respondent cites Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1076 (2004) and Cameron
Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 451, 463 P.2d 287 (1970) in an attempt to support his contention.
However, these cases do not provide that agency is lost due to the impropriety of the actions of an
agent. Rather, they define an exception to the general rule that the acts of the attorney bind the
client.
In Caballero this Court restates the law of Idaho that the attorney-client relationship is one
of agency in which attorney can bind the client, and then goes on to explain that the settlement (or
“compromise”) of claims is an exception to that general rule. Caballero, 140 Idaho at 332, 92
P.2d at 1079. The exception provides that in the compromise of claims “actual” authority must be
conferred upon the attorney by the client. Id. In Caballero it was ultimately determined that the
attorney did indeed have actual authority implied from the circumstance of that case, binding the
client to the settlement agreement reached. Caballero, 140 Idaho at 333, 92 P.2d at 1080.
That exception does not exist in this present matter. Respondent’s attorney was not binding
him to a settlement of claims, but was communicating with the prosecutor on criminal charges
pending against the Respondent. While the exception stated in Caballero is not at issue in the
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present matter, the analysis relating to implied authority does support Appellant’s position that the
Respondent’s attorney was acting within the scope of his representation of Respondent when he
made the disclosure of the confidential information.
Conversely, Respondent has failed to cite a single case that shows that an agency
relationship is somehow destroyed by the improper actions of an agent. Respondent is accountable
for the actions of his attorney where those actions occurred within the course and scope of his
representation of Respondent.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff/Appellant Primera Beef, LLC, respectfully
requests that the Court reverse the District Court’s decision granting Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings including
but not limited to trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of May, 2019.

IL

~

____________________________________
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Larsen, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Primera Beef, LLC
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